The political economy of deposit insurance by Laeven, Luc
 
 
















Abstract: This paper uses a political economy framework to analyze cross-country 
differences in deposit insurance coverage. It finds supporting evidence of the significance 
of private interest theories in explaining coverage of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance 
coverage is significantly higher in countries where poorly capitalized banks dominate the 
market and in countries where depositors are poorly educated. The analysis does not find 
that coverage is significantly related to political-institutional variables, such as the degree 
of democracy or restraints on the executive, or to proxies for the general level of 
institutional development, such as per capita income or property rights. These results 
provide evidence in support of the private interest view, according to which risky banks 
lobby for extensive coverage.  
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Since 1934, the year when the United States introduced deposit insurance, a large number 
of countries have followed the U.S. example and adopted deposit insurance, with a strong 
surge in recent years among developing countries. Yet, a large number of countries have 
thus far not decided to adopt deposit insurance, and deposit insurance schemes vary 
significantly from country to country in coverage and safeguards. 
Deposit insurance design seems to be very much an area in which our 
understanding could greatly benefit from the use of a political economy approach because 
the process underlying the design is a complex interplay of various political 
constituencies with often conflicting interests. Deposit insurance not only affects banks’ 
depositors, but also banks’ other stakeholders, such as shareholders, creditors, bank 
managers, the deposit insurance agency, the government, and taxpayers. Not only will 
interests differ among these various groups of stakeholders, but interests may also differ 
within each group. For example, not all depositors will have the same interest in deposit 
insurance. If coverage is limited, large depositors may be less interested in deposit 
insurance than small depositors. Similarly, if deposit insurance is not risk-sensitive, banks 
that perceive themselves to be of below-average risk may be less interested in the 
adoption of deposit insurance than risky banks.  
The political motives for the implementation of deposit insurance typically 
include the provision of protection for small depositors and the enhancement of public 
confidence in the banking system and systemic financial stability. These goals come at 
large costs, both direct costs in the form of a tax and indirect costs due to increased moral   2
hazard in the behavior of banks. As a result, deposit insurance will typically be favored 
by “weak parties”, such as small depositors and risky banks.  
This paper empirically investigates how cross-country differences in political, 
regulatory, and institutional setup affect the size of deposit insurance coverage, measured 
as the ratio of coverage limit per depositor to per capita income. It finds that deposit 
insurance coverage is higher in countries where poorly capitalized banks dominate the 
market and in countries where depositors are poorly educated. It does not find that 
coverage is related to political-institutional variables, such as the degree of democracy or 
restraints on the executive, and to proxies for the general level of institutional 
development, such as per capita income or property rights. These results provide 
evidence in support of the private interest view, according to which risky banks lobby for 
extensive coverage. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 reviews some of the related literature. 
Section 2 outlines hypotheses about the factors that affect the support for extensive 
coverage of deposit insurance. This section also presents the data and the variable 
definitions. Section 3 presents the empirical model and results, and section 4 concludes. 
 
1. Related Literature 
Deposit insurance at a national level was first introduced in the United States in 1934, in 
reaction to the loss of public confidence during the Great Depression of 1930-33. 
Although the majority of U.S. Congress did not subscribe to the idea of deposit insurance 
until the crisis in 1933, the political change that led to the adoption of deposit insurance 
was the result of widespread losses suffered by depositors.   3
The introduction of deposit insurance in the United States is an informative 
episode about the political economy of deposit insurance reforms. Calomiris and White 
(1994) argue that the smaller and weaker unit banks in the United States had long 
supported deposit insurance, and that they would have never been able to successfully 
lobby for the introduction of deposit insurance against the opposition of the politically 
more powerful, stronger and larger urban branching banks had the Great Depression not 
occurred and eroded public confidence in the banking system as a whole. Economides, 
Hubbard and Palia (1996) also argue that the introduction of deposit insurance in the 
United States was instituted for the benefit of the small, unit banks. 
Kane and Wilson (1998), on the other hand, show that large banks’ share prices 
benefited most from the introduction of deposit insurance. They argue that the 
broadening shareholder distribution of large banks during the late 1920s had undermined 
monitoring incentives by large-bank shareholders, and that deposit insurance restored 
depositor confidence. 
With deposit insurance in place, the smaller and weaker banks continuously 
pressed for increases in the coverage. Prompted by increased competition from the 
emerging credit unions and thrifts, coverage levels were raised at various moments 
during the post-Depression period and deposit insurance was spread to all U.S. deposit-
taking institutions (White, 1998). 
Before the introduction of nationwide deposit insurance in the United States in 
1934, several states had already established depositor protection schemes. White (1981) 
shows that the main factor influencing the adoption of deposit insurance by a state was   4
the structure of its banking industry. The support for deposit insurance was stronger in 
states where small unit banks were dominant than in states with large banks. 
The U.S. experience may be somewhat unique because of the existence of state-
level differences in banking structures resulting from differences in state-level restrictions 
on bank branching. Some states allowed branch banking, while others preferred unit 
banking. As a result, certain states had a much larger share of small banks. Nevertheless, 
the U.S. experience does show that support for deposit insurance will depend on the 
banking structure of the country and is likely to be greater in banking systems where 
weak institutions hold a large share of the market. However, whether small banks are 
perceived to be riskier than large banks will depend on country circumstances. The U.S. 
experience also suggests that politicians may become more inclined to adopt deposit 
insurance in the wake of a financial crisis, when there is a widespread loss of public 
confidence in the banking system and weak banks are able to gain considerable interest. 
The adoption of compulsory deposit insurance in Canada in 1967 was also in 
reaction to a loss in confidence in the sound practice of deposit-taking institutions, 
despite the protests of Canada’s large banks that did not want to cross-subsidize their 
smaller rivals, which were perceived to be riskier. In 1985, two banks in Alberta failed, 
confirming the concerns raised earlier by the country’s major banks and causing a 
depletion of the deposit insurance fund. The failed banks were bailed out at a large cost to 
the taxpayer (see Giammarino, Schwartz and Zechner (1989) for estimates of the degree 
of cross-subsidization taking place among Canadian commercial banks during the period 
1980-1985 due to flat-rate deposit insurance premiums).   5
The U.S. and Canadian experiences suggest that international differences in the 
setup of deposit insurance may be best explained by applying a political economy 
framework. Economists have broadly taken two approaches to analyzing policy 
outcomes: the public interest view and the private interest view (see Kroszner and 
Strahan (2001) for a more detailed discussion). The public interest theory of regulation 
argues that regulatory intervention occurs in the interest of the public at large (Joskow 
and Noll, 1981). The public interest rationale for deposit insurance includes the 
protection of small, uninformed depositors and the stability of the banking system 
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). The private interest theory of regulation describes the 
regulatory process as one of interest group competition, in which well-organized or 
powerful groups exert pressure on politicians and regulators for regulatory intervention 
that would allow those groups to capture rents at the expense of more dispersed groups 
(Stigler, 1971, Peltzman, 1976, and Becker, 1983). 
In the financial services industry, competition among organized interests is 
particularly typical as financial institutions pressure politicians for regulations that 
increase their franchise values (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998). According to the private 
interest view, deposit insurance is most likely to be favored by the riskier banks because 
they would receive a net subsidy at the expense of the safer banks in the presence of 
explicit deposit insurance. Lobbying for deposit insurance in the United States has 
historically been consistent with this pattern of relative benefits (Kroszner, 1998). 
A key challenge to the public interest theory is that some forms of bank regulation 
are difficult to understand from a welfare-maximizing point of view. Deposit insurance 
systems that exacerbate moral hazard problems are generally difficult to rationalize on   6
public interest grounds (Kane, 1996), unless the benefits of deposit insurance are so large 
that they exceed the cost of increased moral hazard. 
It is important to note that the public interest and private interest theories need not 
be mutually exclusive, and that both theories can be consistent with certain policy 
outcomes.
1 Nevertheless, each theory captures an important element in the political 
decision-making process, and our empirical work will therefore try – to the extent 
possible – to assess their relative importance. 
  Although interest group theories have long been applied to the fields of public 
economics (including the areas of fiscal policy and public debt issue)
2, monetary 
economics
3, and international trade
4 (see Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Grossman and 
Helpman (2001) for extensive overviews), only recently have such theories been applied 
to finance topics (see Pagano and Volpin (2001a) for an overview). For example, 
Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) and Kroszner and Strahan (2001) have applied interest 
group theories to banking, Bolton and Rosenthal (2002) to sovereign debt renegotiation,  
Pagano and Volpin (2001b) to corporate governance, and Perotti and Volpin (2003) to 
firm entry. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to apply such tools in an international 
context to the area of deposit insurance. 
Our paper is related to work by Kroszner and Strahan (2001), who study whether 
interest group theories can explain the voting outcomes in the U.S. House of 
Representatives on the Wylie Amendment on the limitation of deposit insurance to a 
                                                 
1 Both public and private interests are driven by beliefs and ideology (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) and the 
institutional arrangements of the decision-making process (North, 1990). 
2 See, for example, Alesina and Tabellini (1990). 
3 See, for example, Barro and Gordon (1983). 
4 For example, Krueger (1974) describes economies as rent-seeking societies and applies private interest 
theories to the area of trade, and Grossman and Helpman (1995) use a model of political lobbying to study 
free-trade agreements.   7
single account per bank. They find that limits to deposit insurance were opposed to by 
U.S. states where small banks had a large share of the market and by states with a large 
proportion of people over 65 years of age. The amendment was favored by states where 
banks could sell insurance products and where the insurance industry was relatively 
large. Political-institutional variables, such as political party structure and ideology, on 
the other hand, did not explain much of the variation beyond these private interest 
variables.
5 
  In explaining cross-country variation in the support for deposit insurance, 
institutional factors seem to be particularly important. Previous research has shown that 
the moral hazard problems associated with deposit insurance tend to be exacerbated in 
countries with weak institutional environments (Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane, 2002), while 
the detrimental impact of explicit deposit insurance is largely offset in countries with 
strong institutional environments (Hovakimian, Kane, and Laeven, 2003). Public interest 
theory would therefore imply that deposit insurance should be limited in countries with 
weak institutional arrangements, as excessive risk-shifting behavior of banks is not in the 
public interest. On the other hand, private interest theory would imply that such 
environments are more prone to bribery and lobbying by private interest parties, resulting 
in a broad coverage of deposit insurance.
6 
                                                 
5 Our work is also somewhat related to the literature on the political economy of social security and 
government pension systems. For example, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) show in an interest group 
model that the elderly can successfully lobby for larger social security programs. Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-
Martin (2002) study the effect of democracy on the size and design of social security systems in different 
countries. While social security budgets tend to be significantly higher in countries with a larger share of 
population with age over 65, they do not find a significant relationship between the degree of democracy 
and the size of social security. 
6 Political economy tools may also help improve our understanding of why deposit insurance is underpriced 
in most countries. In countries with explicit deposit insurance, deposit insurance is underpriced if the 
deposit insurer charges less for its services than the estimated opportunity-cost value of these services. 
Underpricing of deposit insurance services is a sign that banks extract deposit-insurance subsidies. Since   8
 
2. Data and Hypotheses 
Our empirical work focuses on the coverage of deposit insurance. In this section, we 
describe the factors that may drive the political outcome on the coverage of deposit 
insurance, the definitions of the regression variables, and the sources of the data. Some of 
the variables we consider will help us to differentiate between public and private interest 
theories, while others will be consistent with both theories. We will measure the effect of 
political-institutional factors relative to the proxies for other country characteristics. Our 
hypotheses will relate the size of deposit insurance coverage across countries to the 
proxies we describe below. Most of these measures are similar to the ones used by 
Kroszner and Strahan (2001) in their study on the determinants of political support for the 
amendment on the coverage of deposit insurance in the United States, and we will follow 
their approach as closely as possible to enhance comparability of their results with those 
obtained in our work. Naturally, the proxies used and results obtained will differ because 
we analyze data from many countries rather than just U.S. data. 
First, we control for the political-institutional setup of the country. The voices of 
minorities are more likely to be heard in political systems that are less autocratic (or more 
democratic). As a result, countries with these political arrangements are more likely to 
support high coverage limits of deposit insurance. While the views of the politicians may 
simply reflect the economic interests of the constituents in the country (Peltzman, 1976), 
                                                                                                                                                 
large banks typically do not consider deposit insurance to be in their interest, they will (typically 
successfully) lobby for low premiums. Under flat-rate deposit insurance, which is the norm in most 
countries, premium rates will often be set such that they are affordable for the smaller banks and acceptable 
for the larger banks. As a result, deposit premiums will often be set below the actuarially “fair” value of 
deposit insurance, and deposit insurance will be subsidized. A large literature has compared actual 
premiums with estimated actuarially fair values, mostly based on the option pricing model introduced by 
Merton (1977) and adapted by Ronn and Verma (1986), and has found existing deposit insurance programs 
to be underpriced in most countries. We refer to Laeven (2002b) for a review of this literature.   9
we consider several political variables to adjust for any independent influence of party 
politics. First, we construct a variable POLITY that is a composite measure of the general 
openness of political institutions in the country. This variable is calculated by taking the 
average for the years 1990-99 of the Polity IV composite index of the country. Polity IV 
is the updated version of the cross-country database on political regime characteristics 
and transitions during the period 1800-2002. The Polity database was originally designed 
by Ted Robert Gurr and has been updated by Monty Marshall and Keith Jaggers. The 
database is maintained at the Center for International Development and Conflict 
Management of the University of Maryland. This database has been widely used by 
researchers as a source of data on political-institutional characteristics.   
We also construct a variable DEMOC that is the average for the years 1990-99 of 
the Polity IV democracy index, and a variable AUTOC that is the average for the years 
1990-99 of the Polity IV autocracy index. DEMOC ranges from 0 to 10 with a higher 
score indicating more democracy (and general openness of political institutions). 
AUTOC also ranges from 0 to 10 with a higher score indicating a more autocratic 
government (and general closedness of political institutions). The Polity IV composite 
index equals the difference between the Polity IV democracy index and the Polity IV 
autocracy index. POLITY ranges from –10 to 10 with a higher score indicating more 
democracy and a lower score indicating more autocracy. The polity index is based on 
measures of the degree of competitiveness of political participation, the regulation of 
political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and 
constraints on the chief executive.   10
We also construct a variable XCONST that is the average for the years 1990-99 of 
the Polity IV sub-index on executive constraints. XCONST measures the extent of 
institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives. 
XCONST ranges from 0 to 10 with a higher score indicating less de facto operational 
independence (and more accountability) of the country’s chief executive. XCONST 
captures the extent to which the political system enables minorities or non-elites to 
influence political elites in regular ways. 
Next, we construct a variable COALITION that takes a value of one if the 
government of the country is a coalition government, and zero otherwise. The variable 
COALITION is averaged for the years 1975-97 and is based on data collected by the 
World Bank. For more details on this database, see Beck et al. (2001). Unfortunately, we 
do not have cross-country data on political campaign contributions from interest groups, 
unlike Kroszner and Strahan (2001) in their study of state-level deposit insurance limits 
in the United States. Therefore, we cannot control for the effect that money contributions 
may have on the voting patterns of politicians. 
Second, we control for structural differences within the banking industry. Private 
interest theory emphasizes how different interest groups can provide funds and votes to 
politicians who, in turn, control the regulatory decision to raise the coverage level of 
deposit insurance. Private interest theory thus predicts that support for high coverage 
levels is more likely in countries with greater political influence of risky banks relative to 
that of safe banks. Public interest theory, on the other hand, would imply that support for 
high deposit insurance coverage is less likely in countries where the share of risky banks 
is large because the social costs of deposit insurance are directly related to the size of the   11
protected groups of risky banks. The social costs of (extensive) deposit insurance include 
deadweight losses associated with reduced competition and increased moral hazard 
relative to banking without (extensive) deposit insurance (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). 
In the United States, small banks have lobbied to raise the coverage of deposit 
insurance since the adoption of national deposit insurance in 1934 because a higher 
coverage would protect them from competition from larger and more efficient banks 
(Calomiris and White, 1994). However, whether small banks are riskier than large banks 
depends, among others, on country circumstances. In many countries, the largest banks 
are often state-owned and perceived to be riskier than the smaller, private banks in the 
country. Also, private monitoring incentives of large, private banks may be negatively 
affected by the fact that these banks tend to have more dispersed ownership, and as a 
result these banks may take more risk (Kane and Wilson, 1998, and Laeven, 2002a). 
Our proxy for the strength of the small banks is the fraction of banking assets in 
small banks in each country. We refer to this variable as SMLBNK. We define banks as 
small if they have assets below the median size of all banks operating in the country. By 
allowing the definition of SMLBNK to vary across countries, we take into account cross-
country heterogeneity in the size of banks. 
We also include a variable LOWCAP that is the fraction of banking assets in 
banks with below median capital-asset ratio for all banks operating in the country. This 
measure captures the relative size of poorly capitalized banks. Private interest theory 
predicts that poorly-capitalized banks are more likely to favor high levels of deposit 
insurance coverage than well-capitalized banks because poorly-capitalized banks are 
perceived to be riskier. Public interest theory, on the other hand, predicts that politicians   12
in countries with a large number of poorly capitalized banks are more likely to oppose 
high levels of deposit insurance coverage because the risk of bank failure and bailout 
increases in such environments. We obtain data on bank size and bank capital from 
BANKSCOPE, a commercial database of financial statements of international banks 
maintained by Bureau Van Dijk. We use data for the year 1999. 
As an alternative measure of bank risk, we use NPLAST, which is defined as the 
ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans. Data on the share of nonperforming loans 
come from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004). The data refer to year-end 1999. Public 
interest theory would imply that politicians in countries with a higher share of 
nonperforming loans are more likely to oppose a broad coverage of deposit insurance 
because the risk of bank failure and bailout increases in such environments. On the other 
hand, banks with a large portfolio of bad assets will be a powerful lobby for extensive 
deposit insurance. Private interest theory, therefore, predicts that countries with a larger 
share of nonperforming loans are more likely to have broad coverage of deposit 
insurance. 
Third, we control for the level of education in the country. We expect that 
education has a negative impact on the level of deposit insurance coverage because more 
educated citizens are more likely to understand that limiting deposit insurance reduces 
moral hazard. However, the effect could be ambiguous because the level of education 
may be correlated with the degree to which people use the banking system and, therefore, 
care about their claims. Our proxy for the level of education is SCHOOL, which is the 
gross secondary school enrollment in the country. In a robustness test, we use the literacy 
rate of the adult population in the country as a proxy for the education level in the   13
country. The data on school enrollment and literacy rates are from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators database. For each country, we use the schooling and 
literacy rates for the year 2000. 
Fourth, we control for the overall level of economic development. The research 
summarized in Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002) suggests that high deposit insurance 
limits are more feasible in countries with better institutional environments because good 
institutions serve to mitigate the moral hazard effects of explicit deposit insurance. The 
public interest view would thus suggest that the level of deposit insurance coverage is 
likely to be higher in countries with better institutional environments. To the extent that 
such systems also bring about safer banks, the private demand for deposit insurance 
would be lower in these countries. Private interest theory thus predicts that coverage 
levels of deposit insurance are likely to be lower in countries with a high level of 
economic development. As measure of the overall level of economic development, we 
include per capita GDP in 1995 expressed in 1995 U.S. dollars. We refer to this variable 
as GDPCAP. In the regressions, we use the logarithm of this variable. The data on per 
capita income are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. 
Fifth, we control for the effect of differences in demographics of the population. 
Since elderly people typically have more liquid assets than younger people and tend to 
mainly use bank deposits as a savings vehicle, private interest theory predicts that 
legislators from countries with a larger share of elderly people are more likely to vote in 
favor of high coverage limits of deposit insurance. As proxy for the importance of elderly 
constituents we use the variable POP65, which is the share of the total population in the 
country with age 65 and above at year-end 2000. The data on the share of the population   14
with age 65 and above are from the World Development Indicators database of the World 
Bank. 
In a robustness test, we also control for the ability of banks to engage in 
insurance-related activities. Although insurance companies are not directly subject to 
deposit insurance regulation, they are indirectly affected if banks can sell insurance 
products because they produce substitute products that directly compete with the 
regulated banking industry. A number of countries permit commercial banks to sell 
insurance. In those countries, private interest theory predicts that the insurance industry 
lobby would be particularly concerned about deposit insurance because it may give banks 
a competitive edge in the provision of certain financial services. Thus, private interest 
theory predicts that coverage levels of deposit insurance would be smaller in countries 
where banks may sell insurance. The public interest view suggests that activity 
restrictions prevent the exploitation of scope economies and, therefore, have negative 
wealth effects. Deposit insurance could compensate banks for this opportunity cost. 
Public interest theory thus also predicts that deposit insurance coverage is lower in 
countries where banks can sell insurance. Alternatively, if it is in the public interest to 
protect the franchise value of banks from competing industries, we may find the opposite 
link. Particularly in countries with weak banking systems, it could be in the interest of the 
public to restrict competition among banks. To measure the effects of the rival insurance 
industry, we use a variable RESTRICT that captures the degree to which the country 
restricts banks to sell insurance. RESTRICT can take values between 0 and 3, with a 
higher score indicating more restrictions. A score of 3 indicates that banks are prohibited 
to sell insurance, and a score of 0 indicates that there are no restrictions on banks to sell   15
insurance. Data to construct this variable come from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004). 
The data refer to the year 1999 or 2000. 
We also consider the financial structure of the country, i.e., whether the country’s 
financial system is more market-based or bank-based. STRUCTURE is a measure of the 
size of stock markets relative to that of banks. To measure the size of the domestic stock 
market, we use the market capitalization ratio, which equals the value of domestic 
equities listed on domestic exchanges divided by GDP. To measure the size of banks, we 
use the private bank credit ratio, which equals the value of total bank credit to the private 
sector divided by GDP. STRUCTURE equals the logarithm of the market capitalization 
ratio divided by the private bank credit ratio. We use the average of this variable over the 
years 1995-99 as proxy for financial system structure. A higher score indicates a more 
market-based system, and a lower score indicates a more bank-based system. This 
variable has previously been used as a measure of financial system structure by Levine 
(2001), among others. Because he calculates this variable over the period 1980-95, the 
Levine dataset has data on only 31 of the countries with explicit deposit insurance in our 
dataset. We therefore update the financial structure variable for the countries in our 
sample using data on stock market capitalization and credit to the private sector for the 
years 1995-99, increasing the number of countries with explicit deposit insurance for 
which data on financial structure are available from 31 to 52. Data on stock market 
capitalization and private bank credit ratios come from the World Development 
Indicators database of the World Bank. 
Next, we control for the contracting environment of the country. Since moral 
hazard problems associated with deposit insurance tend to be exacerbated in countries   16
with weak contracting environments (Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane, 2002), public interest 
theory predicts that countries with poor contracting environments are less likely to have 
high levels of deposit insurance coverage. Since countries with poor contracting 
environments tend to have weaker banks, private interest theory predicts that countries 
with poor contracting environments are more likely to have high coverage levels, as a 
result of the lobby of the constituents representing these weak banks. As a proxy for the 
contracting environment in the country, we use an index of property rights from the Index 
of Economic Freedom developed by the Heritage Foundation. PROPERTY is the score of 
this index of property rights for the year 1999. The index ranges from 1 to 5 with a lower 
score indicating a better protection of private property. The score is based on the degree 
of legal protection of private property, the probability that the government will 
expropriate private property, and the country’s legal protection of private property. This 
broad index of property rights is available for a large set of countries and has been used 
by other researchers (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1999). 
  Data on the adoption and coverage of explicit deposit insurance come from Garcia 
(2000), Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci (2001) and Laeven (2002b). Because the data are 
missing for a number of countries that recently adopted deposit insurance and because the 
data on coverage is outdated for a number of countries, we update and supplement the 
data for a number of countries using country sources (mainly deposit insurance laws 
obtained from central banks and official deposit insurance agencies). Our analysis will 
use two variables. The first variable, COVGDP, measures the size of deposit insurance 
coverage and is calculated as the ratio of coverage limit per deposit to GDP per capita at 
year-end 2000. We express coverage limits in terms of per capita GDP to enhance   17
comparability of coverage across countries with different levels of economic 
development. Because the average deposit tends to be larger in more developed countries 
and because governments typically intend to insure at least a certain minimum share of 
total deposits (or depositors), developed countries tend to have higher coverage limits 
than developing countries.  
  For robustness, we use an alternative measure of the size of deposit insurance 
coverage, COVDEP, which is calculated as the ratio of coverage limit per deposit to total 
deposits per capita at year-end 2000. By comparing coverage limits to the value of 
deposits, this variable captures the degree of coverage per depositor. 
For countries that have adopted explicit deposit insurance, we also collect 
information on the year of adoption. The variable AGE measures the age of the explicit 
deposit insurance scheme in the country, and is calculated as 2000 minus the year during 
which the country introduced explicit deposit insurance. The source of the variable AGE 
is Garcia (2000), Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci (2001) and Laeven (2002b). AGE takes 
values between 0 and 66. The value for the United States is 66 since the United States 
was the first country to introduce explicit deposit insurance in 1934. In a robustness test, 
we use a Heckman selection model to control for potential sample selection bias. The 
first-stage of the selection model uses a variable DI, which takes a value of one if the 
country has explicit deposit insurance at year-end 2000, and zero otherwise. This variable 
identifies whether the country has explicit or implicit deposit insurance. 
Our dataset is limited by the number of countries for which we have data on the 
existence and coverage of deposit insurance. We have such data for 111 countries. Most 
of our empirical results are based on the sub-sample of countries with explicit deposit   18
insurance rather than the total sample of countries. The number of countries included in 
our regressions varies somewhat because we miss data for some of the control variables. 
The data of the main regression variables are shown in Annex 1. Table 1 shows that of 
the 111 countries in our sample, 69 countries (or 64 percent) have explicit deposit 
insurance. To our knowledge, this represents the complete list of countries with explicit 
deposit insurance as of year-end 2000. 
The sample statistics of the regression variables are reported in Table 2. For most 
countries in our sample, GDP per capita exceeds total deposits per capita. The average 
value of COVDEP is, therefore, significantly larger than the average value of COVGDP. 
We also find that there is a wide variation across countries in the size of deposit insurance 
coverage as measured by COVGDP and especially COVDEP.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
In order to determine the influence of the political-institutional and other factors 
described above on the coverage level of deposit insurance, we use multiple regression 
analysis. This approach will also enable us to empirically investigate the relative 
importance of private and public interest theories in explaining cross-country variation in 
the coverage of deposit insurance. The dependent variable is COVGDP, which is the ratio 
of coverage limit per deposit to per capita GDP at year-end 2000. The explanatory 
variables in our base regressions include POLITY, LOWCAP, GDPCAP, SCHOOL, and 
POP65. The results are presented in Table 3. 
We find that our political-institutional variable, POLITY, has little power in 
explaining variation in COVGDP. Most of the variation in COVGDP is explained by the   19
variable LOWCAP, our measure of the share of risky banks in the system. We find that 
coverage is higher (as measured by COVGDP) in countries where banks with relatively 
low capital-to-asset ratios constitute a larger share of the banking system. This result is 
consistent with the private interest view. 
We also find that coverage is lower in countries with higher secondary school 
enrollment rates, as measured by the variable SCHOOL. However, this effect loses 
statistical significance once we control for POP65, the share of the population with age 
65 and above. We do not find that our proxy for the general level of economic 
development, GDPCAP, is significantly associated with the size of coverage, and the 
significance of LOWCAP is not affected once we control for the level of per capita GDP 
in the country. 
For robustness, we consider several alternative and additional explanatory 
variables. First, we use more specific measures of the political arrangements in the 
countries in our sample. These include the Polity sub-indexes DEMOC and AUTOC, the 
Polity measure of executive constraints XCONST, and the indicator COALITION. The 
results of using these alternative measures of political arrangements in the country are 
presented in columns 1 to 4 of Table 4. In addition to these political variables, we also 
control for LOWCAP and SCHOOL, the two variables with most explanatory power in 
the regressions presented in Table 3. Again, we find that the political-institutional 
variables have little power in explaining variation in COVGDP. While we find that 
coverage levels are lower in countries with more democratic (less autocratic) 
governments, in countries that place more constraints on the executive, and in countries   20
with coalition governments, none of these alternative political variables is significant 
from a statistical point of view. 
As a second robustness test, we include alternative measures of the relative size of 
risky banking assets in the country. These include the variables NPLAST and SMLBNK. 
The results are presented in columns 5 and 6 of Table 4.  While we find that coverage 
levels are significantly higher in countries where banks have a larger proportion of 
nonperforming loans, which is consistent with private interest theory, we do not find that 
the level of coverage limits is significantly affected by the share of small banks in the 
banking system, as measured by the variable SMLBNK. Under the presumption that 
smaller banks tend to be riskier than large banks, private interest theory would predict 
that deposit insurance limits are higher in countries where the political influence of the 
smaller, riskier banks relative to that of the larger, safer banks is greater, and would thus 
predict a positive relationship between COVGDP and SMLBNK. To the extent that small 
banks are riskier and less efficient than large banks, a negative relationship between 
COVGDP and SMLBNK is consistent with public interest theory because the social costs 
of deposit insurance are likely to be higher in countries where the size of the riskier and 
smaller banks is relatively larger. While previous research on the U.S. banking system 
(including Kroszner and Strahan, 2001) has used bank size as a proxy for bank risk, our 
results suggest that bank size is not necessarily a good proxy for bank risk in other 
countries around the world. Our other proxies for bank risk, LOWCAP and NPLAST, 
provide statistically significant evidence in support of a positive association between 
coverage limits and the share of risky banks, which is consistent with the private interest 
view.   21
Next, we use adult literacy rates as an alternative measure of the country’s 
education level. The regression results that we obtain when controlling for LITERACY 
are reported in column 7 of Table 4. We find a significantly negative association between 
literacy rates and the level of coverage limits, which is consistent with the results 
obtained when using secondary school enrollment rates as a measure of education levels 
in the country. These results suggest that coverage is more limited in countries with better 
educated depositors. Note that the number of countries drops to 33 because we do not 
have information on literacy rates for many countries (including all developed countries) 
in our sample.
7 
We also consider restrictions on insurance activities. The results obtained when 
adding RESTRICT to the regression specification are presented in column 8 of Table 4. 
We find that the presence of more restrictions on insurance activities is positively related 
to the size of deposit insurance coverage, although the effect is not statistically 
significant. This result is consistent with private interest theory, which predicts that 
opposition against high coverage limits is greater in countries where banks can sell 
insurance products. On the other hand, if it is in the public interest to protect the franchise 
value of banks from competing industries, then high coverage limits of deposit insurance 
are more likely when there are no activity restrictions. Public interest theory, therefore, 
predicts that the presence of restrictions on insurance activities is negatively correlated 
with the size of deposit insurance coverage. 
                                                 
7 In a robustness test, we assume literacy rates of 100 percent for all developed countries. The results do not 
change.   22
Next, we control for financial structure using the variable STRUCTURE. The 
results are presented in column 9 of Table 4. We do not find that having a market- or 
bank-based system significantly affects the size of deposit insurance coverage. 
Finally, we control for the level of property rights in the country. Column 10 in 
Table 4 shows the results when controlling for PROPERTY. The variable PROPERTY 
proxies for the protection of property rights in the country and more generally for the  
country’s contracting environment. Since the moral hazard problems associated with 
deposit insurance are likely to be exacerbated in countries with poor protection of 
property rights, public interest theory would predict a negative relationship between the 
protection of property and the size of deposit insurance coverage. However, we find that 
coverage limits are higher in countries with better protection of property rights, although 
the effect is not statistically significant (note that a lower score of the property rights 
index indicates greater protection of property). This result is more consistent with private 
interest theory, which predicts that the constituents representing weak banks in countries 
with poor contracting environments are more likely to lobby for high levels of deposit 
insurance coverage. Overall, we find that coverage levels are best explained by measures 
of relative bank risk (LOWCAP) and education levels (SCHOOL). 
As an additional robustness test, we use COVDEP as alternative dependent 
variable instead of COVGDP. The regression results using COVDEP as dependent 
variable are reported in Table 5. Our results do not change, which is not surprising, given 
that the average deposit per capita is highly correlated with per capita GDP. Again, we 
find that coverage is greater in countries that have a larger share of banks with relatively 
low capital-to-asset ratios and in countries with lower secondary school enrollment rates.   23
Political variables (POLITY, DEMOC, and AUTOC) do not have additional power in 
explaining variation in the size of coverage beyond the effect of our proxies for bank risk 
and education levels. Per capita income also does not enter significantly once we control 
for LOWCAP and SCHOOL. 
We are also concerned about the possibility that sample selection could affect our 
results. The European Union (EU) directive on deposit insurance of 1994 imposes 
minimum standards on national deposit insurance policies in the 15 EU countries, 
including a minimum covered amount of €20,000 per individual. As a result, many EU 
countries have set their coverage limit at the required minimum of €20,000 (although the 
official level exceeds the prescribed minimum in a number of EU countries, such as 
France and Italy). In a robustness test, we therefore exclude the 15 EU countries from the 
sample. The results are presented in column 1 of Table 6. The explanatory variables 
include our main political variable, POLITY, and the two variables that have thus far 
shown to explain most of the variation in the size of deposit insurance coverage, 
LOWCAP and SCHOOL. The dependent variable is again COVGDP. The results are 
similar, although the schooling rate variable loses significance. The LOWCAP variable, 
however, remains strongly statistically significant. The effect of LOWCAP on COVGDP 
is also significant from an economic point of view. The coefficient estimates in column 1 
of Table 6 suggest that a one standard deviation reduction in LOWCAP would lead to a 
decrease in COVGDP of about 0.71 (other things equal). Compared to an average value 
for COVGDP of 2.60, this is a large decrease (of about 27%). 
The EU-accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe have also been pressed 
to adopt deposit insurance and raise their coverage levels to a minimum of €20,000 in   24
preparation for full membership in the EU. While most EU-accession countries are 
increasing their coverage levels gradually and have not yet reached the level of €20,000, 
the drive to comply with EU standards is clearly an external factor affecting the coverage 
levels in these countries, which could potentially bias our results. We therefore check the 
robustness of our results by excluding the EU-accession countries. The results of this 
robustness test are presented in column 2 of Table 6. Our results are not affected. Again, 
we find that COVGDP is positively associated with LOWCAP and negatively associated 
with SCHOOL.
8 
Recently, many countries have adopted deposit insurance because they were 
advised to do so by international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The IMF view culminated in the issuance of a set of guidelines on the 
development of deposit insurance in 1999 (Garcia, 2000). We therefore check how the 
results are affected when we exclude those countries that adopted deposit insurance in 
1999 or later.
9 We use the year 1999 to construct this exclusion rule because this is the 
year that the IMF issued its set of guidelines on developing a deposit insurance system. 
The results are presented in column 3 of Table 6. Our results are qualitatively similar. 
Coverage is higher in countries where banks with relatively low capital-to-asset ratios 
hold a larger share of banking assets and in countries with low school enrollment rates. 
We get similar results when excluding countries that adopted deposit insurance after 1995 
(not reported). 
                                                 
8 The results are similar when we exclude both EU and EU-accession countries. 
9 Another reason for excluding recent adopters is that these countries may not have reached their desired 
level of deposit insurance coverage because coverage limits and deposit insurance fund assets are often 
built-up slowly during the first years following the introduction of deposit insurance. Also, recent adoption 
of explicit deposit insurance may suggest that the majority of constituencies in the country have opposed 
deposit insurance for many years.   25
On the other hand, the current coverage levels of early adopters may not reflect 
the desired level of coverage. While countries do regularly amend their deposit insurance 
laws to update coverage levels, not all countries have done so in recent years. The 
complexity of the political and legal issues underlying financial reform often slows down 
the reform process, and countries generally tend to be reluctant to frequently amend laws. 
As a result, coverage levels are often adjusted only slowly over time. Therefore, we 
check the robustness of our results to excluding countries that adopted deposit insurance 
before 1990 (i.e., ten years before the end of our sample period). This rule excludes 26 
countries or about half of our sample of countries. By excluding these early adopters, we 
align more closely our explanatory variables with the deposit insurance adoption. The 
results are presented in column 4 of Table 6. Our results are qualitatively similar, despite 
the fact that we drop a large number of countries. 
A related concern is that current coverage levels are in part determined by country 
circumstances at the time of deposit insurance adoption. This could render our cross-
sectional analysis invalid. Unfortunately, we do not have data on all control variables at 
the time of adoption and we therefore cannot perform a panel data analysis. However, 
since countries regularly amend their deposit insurance laws to update coverage levels, 
we do not think this is a major problem. Also, this potential problem is likely to be 
greatest for countries that adopted deposit insurance many years ago, but the regression 
results reported in column 4 of Table 6 show that our results are not affected when we 
exclude early adopters. 
Many countries have adopted deposit insurance during episodes of systemic 
financial distress, when there is a loss of public confidence in the banking system   26
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). One would expect deposit insurance coverage 
levels to be higher during periods of financial distress, because of the government’s 
desire to stem the financial crisis and restore public confidence. Coverage levels during 
crisis episodes, therefore, may reflect more the political shift towards increased support 
for deposit insurance rather than political-institutional or other country characteristics.
10  
Because coverage levels are likely to be different during periods of systemic 
financial distress, we exclude in a robustness test countries that are experiencing a 
banking crisis.
11 We use data on the timing of systemic banking crises from Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2002) to identify whether the country is experiencing a banking crisis or not. 
In column 5 of Table 6, we report the results obtained when excluding countries that 
experienced a banking crisis during the year 2000. The results do not change 
qualitatively. The results are also not affected when we exclude countries that 
experienced a systemic banking crisis during the last 3 years (column 6 of Table 6). 
Finally, we are concerned that our results may be biased because actual coverage 
levels are only observed for countries with explicit deposit insurance. We employ a 
Heckman model to control for this potential sample selection problem. The dependent 
variable in the first-stage selection model is DI, a dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if the country has adopted deposit insurance, and zero otherwise. The dependent 
variable in the second-stage regression is COVGDP, the ratio of the coverage limit per 
                                                 
10 Indeed, the U.S. experience of the 1930s shows that policymakers can become more favorable to the 
adoption of deposit insurance in the wake of a financial crisis. While deposit insurance is often adopted 
during financial crisis in the public interest of restoring confidence in the banking system, private interests 
are generally at play as well and are likely to affect the deposit insurance adoption process. The work by 
Calomiris and White (1994) supports this view by arguing that deposit insurance in the United States was 
instituted during the Great Depression not only to restore public confidence, but also for the benefit of the 
smaller and riskier banks that were lobbying for deposit insurance. 
11 Our analysis also excludes countries with government blanket guarantees on deposits from the sample.   27
depositor to the level of per capita GDP. The results are presented in Table 7. We exclude 
countries with full government guarantees on deposits from the sample. 
  Our results do not change qualitatively, although the statistical significance of 
LOWCAP drops somewhat. The first-step results show that countries with a higher 
POLITY score are somewhat more likely to adopt deposit insurance. Countries with 
explicit deposit insurance also tend to have higher values of LOWCAP. Overall, the 
results suggest that there is no significant sample selection bias. 
 
4. Conclusions 
We use a political economy framework to empirically analyze cross-country differences 
in deposit insurance coverage. We find that deposit insurance coverage is higher in 
countries where poorly capitalized banks dominate the market and in countries where the 
average education level of depositors is lower. We do not find that coverage is 
significantly related to political-institutional variables, such as the degree of democracy 
or restraints on the executive, or to proxies for the general level of institutional 
development, such as per capita income or property rights. These results provide 
evidence in support of the private interest view, according to which risky banks lobby for 
extensive coverage. Although it is not always straightforward to differentiate between 
public and private interest theory, these results suggest that cross-country differences in 
deposit insurance coverage are best explained by private interest theory. 
This conclusion is similar to Kroszner and Strahan (2001), who study deposit 
insurance limits in the U.S. banking system and find support mainly for the private 
interest view. They use the relative importance of small banks as a proxy for the risk of   28
the banking system because in the United States small banks tend to be riskier than large 
banks. Using bank size as a measure of bank risk, they find that the size of deposit 
insurance coverage is positively correlated with the share of risky banks. We obtain 
similar results when using capital-to-asset ratios and nonperforming loan ratios as proxies 
for bank risk. We do not find a significant relationship between bank size and deposit 
insurance coverage, suggesting that bank size may not be a good proxy for bank risk in 
countries other than the United States. This could be because the largest banks in many 
countries are often state-owned and inefficient and have risky loan portfolios (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002). 
Although governments often claim that they introduce deposit insurance in the 
interest of the public at large and to protect small depositors, our results suggest that 
politicians are influenced by political constituencies with private interests and need not 
act in the public interest. As a result, deposit insurance need not always be a social 
welfare maximizing proposition. 
We have shown how interest group theory can be applied to the area of deposit 
insurance design. In future work, we plan to use a similar approach to analyze why some 
countries adopt explicit deposit insurance and others do not. To date, the lack of 
longitudinal data on political-institutional and banking structure variables render such 
analysis impossible.   29
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Table 1:  Overview of Deposit Insurance Systems Around the World 
 
This table indicates whether the country has an explicit or implicit deposit insurance system. In total, data is 
available for 111 countries. Data as of end-2000. Of the 69 countries with explicit deposit insurance listed 
here, 7 countries had explicit full government guarantees on deposits in place at end-2000: Chile (only on 
time deposits), Ecuador, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Turkey, and Turkmenistan. 
 
Explicit deposit insurance 
(69 countries) 
Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, FYR of Macedonia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, 
Norway, Oman, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan (China), 
Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, and Vietnam 
Implicit deposit insurance 
(42 countries) 
Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Burundi, Cambodia, China, Costa Rica, Egypt, Arab Rep., Gambia, 
Georgia, Ghana, Guyana, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, 
Moldova, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Qatar, Russian 
Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, 
Thailand, and Zambia 
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Table 2:   Summary Statistics of the Main Variables 
 
This table reports summary statistics for the main variables for the sample of countries with explicit deposit 
insurance. COVGDP is the ratio of coverage limit per deposit to GDP per capita at year-end 2000. 
COVDEP is the ratio of coverage limit per deposit to total deposits per capita at year-end 2000. POLITY is 
the average for the years 1990-99 of the Polity IV composite index. DEMOC is the average for the years 
1990-99 of the Polity IV democracy index. AUTOC is the average for the years 1990-99 of the Polity IV 
autocracy index. XCONST is the average for the years 1990-99 of the Polity IV executive constraints 
index. COALITION is the average for the years 1975-97 of a dummy variable that takes value of one if the 
government of the country is a coalition government, and zero otherwise. LOWCAP is the percentage of 
banking assets in the country in banks with capital-asset ratios below the median size in the country. 
NPLAST is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total assets. SMLBNK is the percentage of banking assets 
in the country in small banks, where banks are defined as small if they have assets below the median size in 
each country. SCHOOL is the secondary school enrollment rate. LITERACY is the adult literacy rate. 
POP65 is the share of the population with age 65 and above in the total adult population (age 15 and above) 
in the country. RESTRICT is a country-level measure of the degree to which banks are restricted to sell 
insurance, and ranges from 0 to 3, with a higher score indicating more restrictions. STRUCTURE is a 
measure of financial system structure for the years 1985-99. A higher score indicates a more market-based 
system, and a lower score indicates a more bank-based system. PROPERTY is an index of property rights 
in the country for the year 1999. GDPCAP is average per capita income over the period 1995-1999 in 1995 







COVGDP  61 2.60 2.03 0.30 9.10
COVDEP 61  8.95 11.05 0.15  68.70
POLITY 56  6.06 5.40 -9.09  10.00
DEMOC 56  7.13 3.36 0.00  10.00
AUTOC  56 1.07 2.18 0.00 9.09
XCONST  56 5.68 1.64 1.80 7.00
COALITION  60 0.26 0.39 0.00 1.00
LOWCAP  60 71.76 20.20 7.67 98.08
NPLAST 44  9.19 11.55 0.10  44.00
SMLBNK 60  8.76 6.22 0.76  26.73
SCHOOL 55  86.30 28.93 26.06  149.38
LITERACY  34 86.90 16.36 39.74 99.80
POP65  55 13.55 5.25 4.50 21.41
RESTRICT  54 1.56 0.95 0.00 3.00
STRUCTURE 52  -0.50 0.88 -3.59  0.84
PROPERTY  60 2.32 1.11 1.00 5.00
GDPCAP  61 12,065.43 14,250.36 190.49 56,372.00
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Table 3:   Determinants of deposit insurance coverage 
 
Dependent variable is COVGDP, which is the ratio of coverage limit per deposit to per capita GDP at year-
end 2000. Regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors. POLITY is the average for the 
years 1990-99 of the Polity IV composite index. LOWCAP is the percentage of banking assets in the 
country in banks with capital-asset ratios below the median size in the country. SCHOOL is the secondary 
school enrollment rate. POP65 is the share of the population with age 65 and above in the total adult 
population (age 15 and above) in the country. GDPCAP is the logarithm of the average per capita income 
over the period 1995-1999 in 1995 U.S. dollars. A more detailed definition of the variables and the sources 
of the data can be found in section 3. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported between 
brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, respectively 1%. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
POLITY -0.112**  -0.081  -0.051 -0.041 -0.056 -0.066 
  (0.048) (0.066) (0.060) (0.054) (0.050) (0.056) 
LOWCAP  0.017*  0.020**  0.028*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
GDPCAP   -0.191    0.270  0.253 
   (0.258)    (0.273)  (0.279) 
SCHOOL     -0.027**  -0.018 -0.026 -0.035** 
      (0.011) (0.019) (0.022) (0.014) 
POP65     -0.065  -0.071   
     (0.104)  (0.101)   
Constant  2.107*** 3.303  3.201*** 3.294*** 1.998  1.976 
  (0.752) (1.998) (0.966) (1.039) (1.834) (1.831) 
        
Observations  55 55 51 51 51 51 
R-squared  0.11 0.12 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.27 
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Table 4:   Determinants of deposit insurance coverage: Alternative explanatory 
variables 
 
Dependent variable is COVGDP, which is the ratio of coverage limit per deposit to per capita GDP at year-
end 2000. Regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors. DEMOC is the average for the 
years 1990-99 of the Polity IV democracy index. AUTOC is the average for the years 1990-99 of the Polity 
IV autocracy index. XCONST is the average for the years 1990-99 of the Polity IV executive constraints 
index. COALITION is the average for the years 1975-97 of a dummy variable that takes value of one if the 
government of the country is a coalition government, and zero otherwise. POLITY is the average for the 
years 1990-99 of the Polity IV composite index. LOWCAP is the percentage of banking assets in the 
country in banks with capital-asset ratios below the median size in the country. NPLAST is the ratio of 
nonperforming loans to total assets. SMLBNK is the percentage of banking assets in the country in small 
banks, where banks are defined as small if they have assets below the median size in each country. 
SCHOOL is the secondary school enrollment rate. LITERACY is the adult literacy rate. POP65 is the share 
of the population with age 65 and above in the total adult population (age 15 and above) in the country. 
RESTRICT is a country-level measure of the degree to which banks are restricted to sell insurance, and 
ranges from 0 to 3, with a higher score indicating more restrictions. STRUCTURE is a measure of financial 
system structure. A higher score indicates a more market-based system., and a lower score indicates a more 
bank-based system. PROPERTY is an index of property rights in the country for the year 1999. GDPCAP 
is the logarithm of the average per capita income over the period 1995-1999 in 1995 U.S. dollars. A more 
detailed definition of the variables and the sources of the data can be found in section 3. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are reported between brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, respectively 1%. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
DEMOC  -0.078           
  (0.108)           
AUTOC   0.123          
   (0.125)          
XCONST    -0.112         
    (0.255)         
COALITION     -0.361        
     (0.610)        
POLITY          -0.086 -0.070 -0.067 -0.041 -0.045 -0.075 
          (0.073) (0.064) (0.048) (0.056) (0.073) (0.067) 
LOWCAP  0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.030***     0.040*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)     (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) 
NPLAST      0.052*       
      (0.026)       
SMLBNK       -0.053      
       (0.044)      
SCHOOL  -0.027** -0.028***  -0.028** -0.030***  -0.005  -0.027**   -0.026** -0.027** -0.030** 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)   (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
LITERACY        -0.039**     
        (0.016)     
RESTRICT         0.449    
         (0.287)    
STRUCTURE          0.011   
          (0.305)   
PROPERTY           -0.296 
           (0.319) 
Constant  3.414***  2.874** 3.688** 3.017***  3.020*** 5.773*** 3.983**  2.304  3.238*** 4.419*** 
  (1.014) (1.078) (1.530) (0.946) (0.928) (1.170) (1.577) (1.420) (1.118) (1.622) 
            
Observations  51 51 51 54 39 51 33 48 49 50 
R-squared  0.25 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.19 0.34 0.36 0.23 0.26 
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Table 5:   Determinants of deposit insurance coverage: Alternative dependent 
variable 
 
Dependent variable is COVDEP, which is the ratio of coverage limit per deposit to total deposits per capita 
at year-end 2000. Regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors. POLITY is the average 
for the years 1990-99 of the Polity IV composite index. DEMOC is the average for the years 1990-99 of the 
Polity IV democracy index. AUTOC is the average for the years 1990-99 of the Polity IV autocracy index. 
LOWCAP is the percentage of banking assets in the country in banks with capital-asset ratios below the 
median size in the country. SCHOOL is the secondary school enrollment rate. GDPCAP is the logarithm of 
the average per capita income over the period 1995-1999 in 1995 U.S. dollars. A more detailed definition 
of the variables and the sources of the data can be found in section 3. Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors are reported between brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
respectively 1%. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
POLITY  -0.335 -0.294    
  (0.227) (0.262)    
DEMOC    -0.679   
   (0.408)   
AUTOC     0.535 
    (0.525) 
LOWCAP  0.090** 0.095** 0.090** 0.092** 
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) 
SCHOOL -0.114*** -0.093**  -0.100*** -0.131*** 
  (0.034) (0.039) (0.035) (0.033) 
GDPCAP   -0.679    
  (1.059)    
Constant  13.674*** 16.961*** 15.400*** 12.394*** 
  (3.217) (6.279) (3.694) (3.241) 
     
Observations  51 51 51 51 
R-squared  0.32 0.32 0.33 0.30 
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Table 6:   Determinants of deposit insurance coverage: Sample selection 
 
Dependent variable is COVGDP, which is the ratio of coverage limit per deposit to per capita GDP at year-
end 2000. Regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors. POLITY is the average for the 
years 1990-99 of the Polity IV composite index. LOWCAP is the percentage of banking assets in the 
country in banks with capital-asset ratios below the median size in the country. SCHOOL is the secondary 
school enrollment rate. A more detailed definition of the variables and the sources of the data can be found 
in section 3. Column (1) excludes EU-15 countries. Column (2) excludes EU-accession countries. Column 
(3) excludes recent adopters (adoption within last 2 years). Column (4) excludes early adopters (adoption 
before 1990). Column (5) excludes countries that experienced a banking crisis during the year 2000. 
Column (6) excludes countries that experienced a banking crisis during the period 1997-2000. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported between brackets. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, respectively 1%. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
POLITY -0.056 -0.047 -0.089 -0.075 -0.049 -0.069 
  (0.064) (0.064) (0.069) (0.066) (0.069) (0.067) 
LOWCAP  0.035*** 0.025**  0.027*** 0.037*** 0.027*** 0.033*** 
  (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) 
SCHOOL -0.017  -0.027**  -0.021** -0.040*  -0.030** -0.037** 
  (0.020) (0.012) (0.010) (0.022) (0.013) (0.014) 
Constant  2.111  3.447*** 3.068*** 3.958**  3.685*** 4.007*** 
  (1.914) (1.095) (0.899) (1.487) (1.146) (1.231) 
        
Observations  37 41 46 25 44 40 
R-squared  0.21 0.22 0.25 0.42 0.26 0.31 
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Table 7:   Heckman model of deposit insurance coverage 
 
Dependent variable is COVGDP, which is the ratio of coverage limit per deposit to per capita GDP at year-
end 2000. Regressions are estimated using a Heckman model, where the dependent variable of the first-
stage selection model is DI, which is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the country has adopted 
explicit deposit insurance, and zero if the country has implicit deposit insurance. The independent variables 
in the selection model are identical to those in the second-stage regression. We exclude countries with full 
deposit guarantees from the sample. POLITY is the average for the years 1990-99 of the Polity IV 
composite index. LOWCAP is the percentage of banking assets in the country in banks with capital-asset 
ratios below the median size in the country. NPLAST is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total assets. 
SCHOOL is the secondary school enrollment rate. POP65 is the share of the population with age 65 and 
above in the total adult population (age 15 and above) in the country. GDPCAP is the logarithm of the 
average per capita income over the period 1995-1999 in 1995 U.S. dollars. A more detailed definition of 
the variables and the sources of the data can be found in section 3. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, respectively 1%. 
 
Second-stage (1)  (2)  (3) 
POLITY -0.053  -0.073  -0.089 
 (0.073)  (0.070)  (0.067) 
LOWCAP 0.028*  0.025*   
 (0.016)  (0.015)   
NPLAST     0.051** 
     (0.025) 
SCHOOL -0.027**  -0.035**  -0.006 
 (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
GDPCAP   0.241   
   (0.299)   
Constant 3.307  2.356  3.194* 
 (2.482)  (2.800)  (1.782) 
      
First-stage (1)  (2)  (3) 
POLITY 0.052*  0.050*  0.043 
 (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.032) 
LOWCAP 0.014**  0.014**   
 (0.007)  (0.007)   
NPLAST     0.008 
     (0.015) 
SCHOOL 0.009  0.004  0.011 
 (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
GDPCAP   0.143   
   (0.149)   
Constant -1.643***  -2.335**  -0.980* 
 (0.622)  (0.961)  (0.546) 
      
Censored observations 
(implicit deposit insurance) 
35 35 33 
Uncensored observations 
(explicit deposit insurance 
51 51 39 
Total observations  86  86  72 
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Annex 1:   The Data 
 
This table reports the country-level data for the sample of countries with explicit deposit insurance. COVGDP is the ratio of coverage limit per deposit to GDP per capita at year-
end 2000. COVDEP is the ratio of coverage limit per deposit to total deposits per capita at year-end 2000. AGE is 2000 minus the year of inception of explicit deposit insurance. 
POLITY is the average for the years 1990-99 of the Polity IV composite index. DEMOC is the average for the years 1990-99 of the Polity IV democracy index. AUTOC is the 
average for the years 1990-99 of the Polity IV autocracy index. XCONST is the average for the years 1990-99 of the Polity IV executive constraints index. COALITION is the 
average for the years 1975-97 of a dummy variable that takes value of one if the government of the country is a coalition government, and zero otherwise. LOWCAP is the 
percentage of banking assets in the country in banks with capital-asset ratios below the median size in the country. NPLAST is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total assets. 
SMLBNK is the percentage of banking assets in the country in banks with assets below the median size in the country. SCHOOL is the secondary school enrollment rate. 
LITERACY is the adult literacy rate. POP65 is the share of the population with age 65 and above in the total adult population (age 15 and above). RESTRICT is a country-level 
measure of the degree to which banks are restricted to sell insurance, and ranges from 0 to 3, with a higher score indicating more restrictions. STRUCTURE is a measure of 
financial system structure for the years 1995-99. PROPERTY is an index of property rights in the country for the year 1999. GDPCAP is average per capita income over the period 
1995-1999 in 1995 U.S. dollars. A more detailed definition of the variables and the sources of the data can be found in section 3. 
 
Country Covgdp  Covdep  Age  Polity  Democ  Autoc Xconst Coalition Lowcap Nplast Smlbnk School Literacy Pop65 Restrict Structure Property Gdpcap 
Argentina 3.9  14.3  21  7.2 7.2 0.0 5.2 0 94.78 9.4 2.86 83.06 96.59 13.33 1 0.13 2 7,935
Austria 0.9  1.1  21  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.61 93.27 2.2 2.69 100.24    18.51 1 -1.86 1 32,763
Bahamas  3.1  4.5  1         0 58.45   8.94               1 13,928
Bangladesh 5.5  21.1  16  5.0 5.5 0.5 4.7 0.04 85.79 43.1 8.91 35.74 39.74 5.08 3 -1.70 4 373
Belarus 1.9  17.4  1  -0.7 3.2 3.9 4.1 0 49.10   6.67  90.00 99.51 16.10 3  4 1,430
Belgium 1.0  1.0  26  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 1 97.75 0.6 0.76 145.27    19.97 1 -0.18 1 30,830
Bosnia and Herz.  2.2  11.8  2            56.76 15.0 23.92  68.41   11.09 1  5 1,526
Brazil 3.1  12.8  26  8.0 8.0 0.0 6.0 0 83.24 3.4 3.26 69.69 84.24 7.07 1 -0.09 3 4,624
Bulgaria 2.2  9.5  2  8.0 8.0 0.0 7.0 0 43.04 6.4 12.62 84.86 98.14 18.65 3 -1.74 3 1,503
Canada 1.8  3.0  33  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 0 92.55 0.7 1.56 105.53    15.30 1 0.15 1 22,541
Colombia 3.8  18.8  15  7.8 7.8 0.0 6.4 0 52.96   13.68  67.05 90.96 6.95   -0.79 3 2,285
Croatia 2.8  6.5  3  -2.8 1.2 4.0 3.3 0 87.49 15.5 6.85 82.83 97.97 16.26 1 -0.96 4 5,146
Cyprus 1.6  1.5  3  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 0 54.99   3.22  83.28 96.46 14.85 1 -0.63 2 14,063
Czech Republic  2.4  3.5  6  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.22 62.72 27.0 7.50 88.47    16.40 1 -0.82 2 5,311
Denmark 1.2  2.3  12  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.74 98.08 0.1 0.90 124.77    18.41 1 0.45 1 38,521
Dominican Rep.  5.3  18.9  38  6.7 6.7 0.0 5.5 0 67.94   18.83               4 2,056
El Salvador  3.0  7.0  9  6.9 6.9 0.0 5.0 0 52.06 2.9 10.96          2  2 1,751
Estonia 0.3  1.0  2  6.0 7.0 1.0 7.0 0 7.67 2.0 7.67  105.21 99.80 17.06 1 0.14 2 4,431
Finland 1.0  2.1  31  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 1 29.00 0.9 9.78 119.29    17.89 2 0.84 1 32,024
France 3.1  4.6  20  9.0 9.0 0.0 6.0 1 89.40 6.6 2.21  110.43    19.20 1 -0.23 2 29,811
Germany 0.9  1.0  34  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 1 87.68   3.72  100.72   18.94 0 -0.90 1 32,623
Greece 2.0  3.7  7  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.13 65.73 4.0 15.23 95.34 96.73 19.70 2 0.48 2 13,105
Guatemala 1.5  8.3  1  5.3 5.8 0.6 4.4 0 65.35 7.1 18.66 27.56 66.83 6.21 2 -2.98 3 1,562
Honduras 7.3  19.3  1  6.2 6.2 0.0 5.0 0 66.49   19.81  32.06 73.14 5.62 1 -1.37 3 711
Hungary 0.8  2.0  7  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.30 71.96 8.2 10.01 97.67 99.27 17.43 1 -0.08 2 5,326  42
Iceland 0.7  1.8  15          1 53.93 2.1 11.39 108.94    15.03 1 -0.54 1 31,304
India 4.9  11.4  39  8.6 8.6 0.0 7.0 0.30 71.19 15.0 8.68 49.03 55.25 7.27 3 0.28 3 459
Ireland 0.9  1.0  11  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.74 74.95   9.61  116.41   14.77 3 -0.32 1 27,741
Italy 6.0  11.4  13  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.74 94.11 11.9 1.51 93.52 98.30 20.31 1 -0.41 2 20,885
Jamaica 1.6  4.1  2  9.3 9.3 0.0 7.0 0 45.96 2.8 5.56 74.91 85.81 10.80 2 0.10 2 2,115
Kazakhstan 1.1  11.1  1  -3.6 1.0 4.6 2.4 0 79.38 1.0 13.35 86.93    9.56 0 0.17 4 1,515
Kenya 3.8  10.7  15  -4.1 0.7 4.8 3.0 0 84.00 35.0 9.62 26.06 79.73 4.99 3 -0.65 3 328
Latvia 0.6  2.8  2  8.0 8.0 0.0 7.0 0.67 42.92 6.0 19.01 85.91 99.80 17.44 1 -0.94 3 2,603
Lebanon 0.9  0.36  33          0 80.61 5.2 7.80 82.28 84.66 8.60 3 -1.85 3 2,891
Lithuania 3.5  20.1  4  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 0 94.52 5.0 4.01 88.63 99.51 15.95 1 -0.10 3 2,167
Luxembourg 0.5  0.15  11          1 63.70 0.2 4.71 89.35    17.44 1 0.58 1 56,372
Macedonia, FYR  4.5  30.9  4  6.0 6.0 0.0 5.0 0 86.34 44.0 10.98 68.22    12.22 3 -3.59   2,535
Morocco 4.1  6.5  7  -6.9 0.0 6.9 2.8 0 27.56 7.0 26.73 38.76 46.44 6.37 3 -0.45 3 1,370
Netherlands 0.9  0.9  21  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 1 96.79   1.32  129.34   16.46 1 0.16 1 30,967
Nigeria 1.5  8.5  12  -3.9 0.8 4.7 1.8 0 81.48 8.2 11.51 31.17 60.14 5.53 1 -0.25 3 254
Norway 7.6  14.8  39  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.83 93.48   4.03  118.17   19.48   -0.74 1 37,954
Oman 6.3  24.2  5  -9.1 0.0 9.1 1.9 0 78.35 5.9 15.51 67.00 67.68 4.50 3 -0.23 2 5,668
Peru 9.1  36.5  8  2.0 3.9 1.9 3.7 0 73.76 18.1 9.52 74.04 88.87 7.02 1 -0.04 2 2,368
Philippines 2.3  4.8  37  8.0 8.0 0.0 6.2 0 77.31 13.8 8.77 76.91 94.65 5.50 1 0.27 2 1,167
Poland 2.9  7.3  5  8.3 8.3 0.0 6.4 0 67.66 4.7 5.95 97.02 99.70 14.69 2 -0.45 2 4,223
Portugal 2.1  2.0  8  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.09 82.12 1.2 5.06 111.27 91.10 18.22 1 -0.87 2 12,794
Romania 1.3  7.8  4  6.4 6.4 0.0 5.5 0.22 69.04 40.0 6.21 78.82 97.86 15.68 3 -1.72 4 1,489
Slovak Republic  2.0  2.8  4  7.8 7.8 0.0 6.4 1 53.78 9.6 16.10 88.45    14.11 2 -1.69 3 4,160
Spain 1.5  1.9  23  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.04 75.84 0.1 3.56 114.86 97.35 19.10 1 -0.36 2 17,798
Sri Lanka  1.6  4.7  13  5.0 6.0 1.0 5.0 0.13 79.74   13.74  73.94 90.94 8.36 0 -0.93 3 860
Sweden 1.1  2.8  4  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.70 97.90   1.42  149.38   21.41 1 0.22 2 31,206
Switzerland 0.5  0.42  16  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 1 96.02 6.0 0.91 98.79    18.61 0 0.30 1 46,737
Taiwan, China  2.3  1.4  15  6.4 6.9 0.6 5.0 0 61.56   18.09          3  1 15,802
Tanzania  1.2  8.6  6  -3.2 1.2 4.4 3.0 0 90.58   6.25               3 190
Trinidad & Tob.  1.3  3.0  14  9.4 9.4 0.0 7.0 0.09 43.22 2.1 17.42 76.67 93.23 9.01 1 0.08 1 5,324
Uganda  6.7  68.7  6  -4.8 0.0 4.8 2.5 0                       2 348
Ukraine 0.3  2.1  2  6.5 6.5 0.0 4.5 0 55.96   12.37  92.79 99.57 16.94   -0.17 4 896
United Kingdom  1.3  1.2  18  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 0.04 96.70 2.2 0.82 140.88    19.48 1 0.28 1 21,667
United States  2.9  7.7  66  10.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 0 69.49 0.6 3.33 96.51    15.87 2 0.09 1 31,996
Venezuela 1.2  8.3  15  8.0 8.0 0.0 5.8 0 58.32 1.6 4.34 47.75 91.75 6.56 1 -0.26 3 3,301
Vietnam 5.3  16.4  1  -7.0 0.0 7.0 3.0 0 93.34   5.27  56.45 92.74 7.97 3  5 356
 